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29 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Helms  
Admiral Taylor

25X1 I am sending along the Report of the Committee on Professional Manpower. The committee members were John Richardson (Chairman), [REDACTED] and Don Chamberlain.

It is a very interesting report and raises a number of problems for solution. In case you do not want to scan the entire report, I have prepared a two-page precis which I think is a fair summary of the report.

Each Deputy Director has a copy of the report, and I plan to meet with the Deputies in the very near future to discuss it with them and to plan courses of action to cope with the problems raised.

In this connection, I am also attaching "for your eyes only" a number of more penetrating questions which I think we must ask ourselves.

[REDACTED]

L. K. White

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Attachments

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
Attachments (3) Committee Report, Precis, Questions

ExDir:LKW:jrf

Distribution:

- 0 - DCI w/atts
- 1 - DDCI w/atts
- 1 - ER w/cy precis
- 1 - ExDir w/cy precis and questions

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Precis of Professional Manpower Committee Report

1. Summary. The quality of the Agency's current cadre of junior officers (i.e., those entering duty between FY 1963 and FY 1967) is equal to or better than previous junior officer groups. CIA's recruitment effort and competitive position are generally satisfactory, although there are recruitment impediments which need remedying and some tentative signs that reactions to anti-Agency publicity and the Vietnam War may pose problems in the future. Finally, all directorates are experiencing difficulties -- some unique to particular directorates and some common to all -- in the area of purposeful career management and the retention of the ablest junior officers. The above conclusions and the following observations were derived from surveys of over ☐ Agency supervisors and ☐ junior officers.

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2. Quality and Sources of Junior Officers. Eighty-six per cent of the Agency supervisors surveyed believe that the FY 1963-67 group of junior officers equals or surpasses those officers entering duty before 1963. (The 14% who felt the contrary all were DD/P or DD/I supervisors.) The Career Training Program is the principal source of DD/P junior officers, an important source for the DD/S (which relies equally on direct hire from business), incidental for the DD/I (which draws 40% of its employees from universities), and irrelevant for the DD/S&T (which relies heavily on universities and industry). Recruitment data and a study near completion by the Office of Medical Services suggest that job performance and career potential bear a strong correlation to the quality of educational institution attended by junior officers. (See Tab J for a brief discussion of this observation.)

3. Recruitment. CIA's university recruitment efforts are proceeding satisfactorily, although some indications that CIA recruiters spread themselves too thin suggest the need to weed out unproductive institutions and to concentrate on some 100 "quality" institutions. Each directorate, but especially the DD/I and DD/S&T, have developed "unilateral" access to the academic community and increasingly rely on such access for recruitment. Recruiters observe that some highly promising prospects are lost because of the lengthy waiting period that ensues between initial interviews and tentative acceptance. Finally, it is believed by some recruiters that the Vietnam War may be negatively affecting recruitment; and DD/I supervisors feel that adverse publicity about the Agency may be affecting the attitudes of good prospects, as well as impairing Agency-academic relations in general.

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4. Career Management. Career planning is not practiced in the Agency with the possible exception of the DD/I which has consistently effected the five-year plans conceived as an aspect of the Midcareer Development Program and which has a centralized system for identifying and developing "comers." The Midcareer Course is viewed more as a "battery recharge" than a development program for the ablest officers. The over-all attrition rate of junior officers entering duty during FY 1963-67 is 28%. (The attrition rate of junior FSO's for FY 1966 and FY 1967, by contrast, was slightly under 10%.) The separation rate is 35% in the DD/S&T where industry constitutes an economically attractive alternative and where the fact that the middle and senior grades are occupied by relatively young officers induces some junior officers to conclude that advancement will be slow. DD/I's attrition rate is 35%, accounted for in part by a 50% turnover in females. DD/P's loss rate is 20%, and the reasons cited include the relative lack of promotion headroom caused by a serious congestion at the senior levels of the CS. Concern is expressed that the CS may be losing some of its ablest young officers.

5. Major Recommendations.

a. Agency intercourse with the academic community needs to be encouraged and improved, including greater substantive exchange between DD/I analysts and key faculty and graduate students, more selective campus recruitment with concentration on "quality" institutions and exploration of ways to counteract or reduce adverse publicity.

b. The Midcareer Program requires both greater review and higher priority. "Comers" need to be spotted and encouraged by the directorates. Individual career plans, especially for the most promising, require more attention and greater follow-through.


c. Additional attention should be given to the congestion at senior levels of the CS and further means developed to induce or compel early retirement or reassignment within the Agency.

d. Centralized procedures should be developed to analyze the high attrition rate among junior officers. Directorates should determine the real reasons why officers leave, and report annually the rate and causes of separation.

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Discussion Topics Arising from Professional Manpower Committee Report  
and Related Studies

1. Recruitment and Quality of Junior Officers

A. OCI and OER are concerned about failure to attract individuals with sufficient educational or area background. DD/S&T and DD/S have difficulties obtaining people in the more specialized scientific and technological areas. The Report mentions examining employment incentives, such as employment travel reimbursement, EOD expenses, greater fringe benefits, and opportunities for sabbatical leave. Other possibilities:

- Greater encouragement and freedom to publish;
- Active program for acquiring or completing advanced degrees and specialized training;
- Expanded interchange between DDI/DDS&T and universities/industry (e. g., one- and two-year "exchange" programs);
- Examination of greater utilization of full-time consultants to work at special projects for one- and two-year stints.

B. The Report suggests that university recruitment is spread too thin. Office of Medical Services' study indicates a strong correlation between performance and potential and quality educational institutions. It is recommended that the recruiters concentrate on the 100-or-so "quality" institutions. The Recruitment Study Committee recommended that raw applicants be screened at the outset by using either the Foreign Service Entrance Exam or a special exam along the lines of the Foreign Service Exam. Other issues:

- Are the recruiters providing bodies mainly for the CT course (i. e., DD/P and DD/S) or are they also servicing adequately DD/I and DD/S&T?
- Are the recruiters equipped to entice the really able prospects, especially those with specialized qualifications?
- Are all sources of prospects being canvassed adequately? The military? Think tanks? International business concerns?

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- Is it possible to reduce or, in selective cases of outstanding prospects, to short-circuit the waiting period between initial contact and a firm job offer?

C. Both the Manpower Committee and the Recruitment Study Group allude to the effects of adverse publicity about CIA. The Study Group recommended the creation of a senior panel to examine this problem and means of improving the Agency's image.

Issues:

- How seriously have graduate student and young professional attitudes been affected by adverse publicity? Are there means available by which to measure such attitudes?
- If the Agency is developing an unsavory reputation in important quarters and if ignorance of the Agency's role impedes arresting this development, are there ways of publicizing certain facets of CIA without violating the canons of a "silent service"? Can the general functioning of such discrete components as NPIC and  be publicized effectively? Are there past "palatable" operational successes, hitherto tightly held, which could be part of the public domain?
- Is it possible for the DCI and/or the DDCI to be more accessible publicly, e.g., not in a "Meet the Press" sort of forum but, say, in an educational TV format?

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2. Career Management and Junior Officer Attrition

A. Though the Manpower Committee diplomatically understates the issue, the Report emphasizes that Career Management is not practiced in the Agency. Each directorate is aware of problems in this connection and sporadically attempts various palliatives but only in the DD/I is there a centralized system for spotting "comers" and systematically monitoring their development. Symptoms of inadequate career management include an attrition rate of 28% among junior officers, overspecialization in geographical areas and tradecraft functions in the CS, and under-employment of talent (especially in the CS). Issues include: ✓

- The 5-year midcareer plans have not been utilized except in the DD/I. One possible means of ensuring or enforcing

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implementation is to require that the Fitness Reports of those in Grades 12-14 include a specific projection of the individual's assignment prospects or alternative prospects over a period of several years. Although such projections often would necessarily be stated in tentative terms, the requirement forces management to plan assignments in advance and ensures that the midcareer officer is consulted at least annually about his prospects, management plans for him, and his own views about his future.

- The Report concludes that the Midcareer Course is not serving its original purpose. One means of better utilizing the Midcareer Course as a device both to recognize and further develop midcareerists with senior executive potential is to require that a special midcareer evaluation, reviewed and signed by Deputies or Assistant Deputies and Independent Office Chiefs or Deputies, be incorporated into selection for the Midcareer Course.
  - The Report suggests that the number of Midcareer Courses be reduced to ensure that only midcareerists with real potential participate.
  - A small but psychologically important innovation might be to initiate a process enabling small groups of outstanding junior officers and midcareerists to meet and exchange views with the DCI and/or the DDCI on a periodic basis. The positive long-term effect on a young officer's morale of meeting "the boss" should not be underestimated.
- B. The raw rate of attrition among junior officers is 28%, though discounting for the high turnover of women and RID employees might reduce the rate slightly. The Department's rate of attrition for junior FSO's is less than 10%. The Report recommends that each directorate assess the rate of and reasons for separation and report annually to the Executive Director.
- Other issues:

- The Report implies that the Committee has reservations about stated reasons for resignations, since many individuals might hesitate to make real or imagined grievances part of the record (presumably to avoid "messy" processing out). Perhaps the IG might be asked to interview all voluntary resignees in

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a certain age and grade group (30-45; GS 11-14) for a period of twelve to eighteen months in order to determine whether there is a pattern of resignations arising from rectifiable personnel management procedures.

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